Moral Constraints on Gender Concepts by Laskowski, N. G.
Moral Constraints on Gender Concepts1 
N. G. Laskowski 
Penultimate draft. Please cite published draft when available. 
1 Introduction 
Is ‘woman’ a sex term that speakers use to talk about biological anatomy?2 Is it a gender term 
that speakers use to talk about a non-biological topic, such as the roles that humans occupy 
in society? Mainstream use of the term suggests an affirmative answer to the former 
question.3 Non-mainstream use in trans communities, among trans-inclusive feminists, 
and elsewhere, suggests an affirmative answer to the latter.4 Call these patterns of use the 
usage constraint. But there is some degree of pressure not to answer both questions 
affirmatively, given the idea sometimes found in linguistics that all else equal, the best 
account of a word is the simplest one on which learning and communicating with it is 
easiest.5 Call this the communicative constraint. The guiding question of this paper is 
whether it is possible to provide an account of ‘woman’ that can satisfy both the usage and 
communicative constraints. 
 
1 Thanks to Robin Dembroff, Esa Diaz-Leon, Nathan Robert Howard, Sofia Huerter, Daniel James, Jennifer 
Saul, and Daniel Wodak for constructive feedback. Thanks also to audiences at The Nature and Significance 
of Social Kinds Workshop at the Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities in Essen, Human Kinds 
Workshop at KU Leuven, the 2018 Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, the Philosophical Anthropology and 
Ethics Research Group seminar organized by Neil Roughley at Duisburg-Essen Universität, the British 
Society for Ethical Theory.  
2 My focus is on the term ‘woman’, but everything I say applies mutatis mutandis to the term ‘man’. 
3 “If one asks an ordinary speaker what it is to be a woman, she/he will almost certainly answer in terms of 
biological traits, most likely genitalia or chromosomes. The same is true of dictionaries.” (Saul 2012: 197) 
4 “...many speakers will sometimes use “woman” as though it is not a sex term after all—this is what they do 
when they refer to trans women who have not undergone reassignment surgeries as “women,” a usage that 
seems perfectly acceptable to many of us.” (Saul 2012: 199-200) 
5 See Dowell (2016). Saul also seems on board: “…feminists need to communicate successfully both with 
each other and with those who are not (yet) feminists, feminists should want to avoid large-scale 
misunderstandings wherever possible.” (Saul 2012: 197) 
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Several philosophers, including Saul (2012), Diaz-Leon (2016), and Barnes (2019: 17), 
recently express varying degrees of support for a view of ‘woman’ that looks up to the task.6 
The basic idea is that ‘woman’ has a single core profile across contexts of use, thereby 
satisfying the communicative constraint, but the core is also sensitive to conversational 
standards that shift from one context to the next, thereby satisfying the usage constraint. 
In Section 2, I trace the development of this contextualist view about ‘woman’ from Saul, 
who offers the view for examination, to Diaz-Leon, who defends a version of the view 
outright. In Section 3, I argue that the modifications Diaz-Leon makes to get around Saul’s 
worries with the view sap it of the flexibility that motivates contextualism about ‘woman’ 
in the first place. My criticisms point toward an alternative view. In Section 4, I float the 
idea that ‘woman’ is ambiguous in a special way. In addition to capturing the apparent 
shiftiness of the term, I argue that such an ambiguity view makes better sense of the 
coherence and significance of some forms of trans-inclusive feminist activism.  
 
2 Contextualism 
The term ‘woman’ appears to live a double life. It seems that speakers use it as a sex term 
to talk about biological anatomy, such as in medical offices or rape crisis centers. But it also 
seems that speakers use ‘woman’ as a gender term to talk about features of individuals that 
involve biological anatomy less obviously, e.g. social roles or self-identifications.7 One 
high-profile reaction to this phenomenon comes from Saul (2012: 201), who presents the 
following view on which ‘woman’ is sensitive to whichever conversational standards are 
salient in context.  
Saul’s Contextualism  “X is a woman is true in a context C iff X is human 
and relevantly similar (according to the standards at 
 
6 Saul offers but ultimately rejects the view, Barnes is “sympathetic”, and Diaz-Leon is all in.   
7 Some philosophers, including Jenkins (2016, 2018) and Wodak and Dembroff (2018), have been 
popularizing the idea that we need to disambiguate gender class from gender identity. Because Saul and Diaz-
Leon do not make this distinction, and because the dust is far from settled on the appropriate application of 
it, I follow Saul and Diaz-Leon in not employing this distinction.  
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work in C) to most of those possessing all of the 
biological markers of female sex.” 
This view purports to capture the conditions under which propositions expressed by 
uses of sentences containing ‘woman’ are true in context. I’ll pass over the first, “human” 
condition on the right-hand side of the statement without comment. The second condition 
has two parts, the first of which concerning “standards at work”, I’ll discuss when I turn to 
Diaz-Leon’s view in a moment. As for the second part of the second condition involving 
“possessing all of the biological markers of female sex,” Saul is using ‘female’ as a sex term 
to talk exclusively about XX chromosomes, vaginal genitalia, and the like.8 (Saul 2012: 215) 
In addition to purporting to capture the truth-conditions of ‘woman’, the view on offer 
from Saul looks like it has the resources to explain the term’s double life. Consider the 
following case.  
Case 1  Lee, who has XX chromosomes, vaginal genitalia, and the like, 
utters ‘I’m a woman’ in a discussion concerning screenings for 
vaginal cancer at a medical office.  
Assuming it is plausible to maintain that one of the “standards at work” is the standard 
of having female anatomy, the view on offer from Saul predicts that ‘woman’ contributes a 
constituent concerning female anatomy to the proposition expressed by the utterance of 
the sentence ‘I’m a woman’. That would appear to explain why ‘woman’ is being used as a 
sex term in Case 1. Now consider another case. 
Case 2  Harper, who has XY chromosomes, penial genitalia, and the like, 
utters ‘I’m a woman’ in a discussion among trans-inclusive feminists.  
Unlike in the previous case, none of the “standards at work” plausibly involve female 
anatomy in Case 2. So, the view on offer from Saul predicts that ‘woman’ doesn’t contribute 
a propositional constituent involving female anatomy. That appears to explain why Harper 
 
8 I follow Saul in employing this terminology but not wading into the controversy surrounding it. For 
discussion, see Mikkola (2017). 
 4 
uses ‘woman’ as a gender term in Case 2.9 The view on offer from Saul looks like it can 
explain the double life of ‘woman’ – it can satisfy the usage constraint. 
Nevertheless, Saul stops short of endorsing contextualism about ‘woman’ out of concern 
for the predictions that the view yields in the full range of cases involving trans individuals. 
(Saul 2012: 203) Consider the following case.  
Case 3  Ash, who possess XY chromosomes, penile genitalia, and the like, 
utters ‘I’m a woman’ in a conversation in which the dominant 
number of participants are traditionalists who reject any non-sex 
involving use of ‘woman’ explicitly.  
Since the “standards at work” appear female anatomy-involving, Saul would worry that 
Ash isn’t using ‘woman’ as a gender term – that Ash’s utterance of ‘I’m a woman’ is false. 
Saul would suggest that the problem with such a result is that it “doesn’t do justice to trans 
women’s claims”.10 (Saul 2012: 210) Saul is well aware that not everyone would share this 
concern. According to Saul, it’s a concern that raises difficult issues concerning whether 
political, moral, or more broadly normative considerations have a role to play in 
philosophical semantics. For the sake of argument, I follow Saul in assuming that an 
adequate characterization of ‘woman’ should predict that Ash is using ‘woman’ as a gender 
term in Case 3. 
Diaz-Leon (2016)  is a fellow traveler, offering a full-throated defense of a contextualist 
approach to characterizing ‘woman’. In particular, Diaz-Leon argues that such an approach 
has no trouble with cases like Case 3. In part because the dominant number of 
conversational participants are traditionalists in Case 3, it looks like the “standards at work” 
in it are sex-based, involving only XX chromosomes, vaginal genitalia, and the like. This 
 
9 Results like these lead Saul to frame the view as an improvement over Haslanger’s (2000). 
10 Arguably, a version of this case in which it is one of the traditionalist’s using ‘woman’ instead of Ash (as in 
e.g. a traditionalist uttering ‘You, Ash, aren’t a woman’) might be one in which it is even clearer that the term 
is being used as sex term, since on some views, speaker intentions play a big role in determining how our 
words are used. Feel free to substitute such a version of the case if that seems more compelling. I am using 
Case 3 as it is because I don’t find the alternative kind of case to pose a clearer challenge, and I wish to 
maintain structural continuity with the other cases in this paper. 
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seems to mean, as we’ve seen, that Ash is using ‘woman’ as a sex term on Saul’s 
contextualism. However, according to Diaz, Saul’s contextualism is stuck with this result 
in virtue of the attitudes of traditionalists. On Saul’s contextualism, Ash is using ‘woman’ 
as a sex term because the view includes the attitudes of traditionalists among those features 
determining the “standards at work” in context. In light of this observation, Diaz-Leon 
suggests a path forward: replace this feature with a new one. Diaz-Leon’s idea is that moral 
or more broadly normative considerations play a role in determining the “standards at work” 
in context. 
Diaz-Leon’s Contextualism X is a woman is true in a context C iff X is 
human and relevantly similar (according to 
the standards at work in C) to most of those 
possessing all of the biological markers of 
female sex, where the standards at work are 
determined by the overall balance of 
normative considerations.” (Diaz-Leon 
2016: 251) 11 
This view looks like it has the resources to make the right predictions. There seem to 
be non-biological features in some of the cases that matter, morally speaking. For example, 
it is plausible to think that denying an individual’s self-identification causes some degree 
of distress. Such denials might be thought to exhibit disrespect or risk inculcating feelings 
of alienation, perhaps not unlike the way in which it might be disrespectful or alienating 
to insist to a theist that they aren’t really a believer.12 If so, then the balance of normative 
considerations might determine that a non-biological, gender-involving standard is “at 
work” in Case 3, not a biological, sex-involving standard. Plausibly, too, Ash is relevantly 
similar in terms of self-identification to most of those possessing all of the biological 
 
11 Diaz-Leon offers several statements of the view that differ subtly from one another. My presentation of 
Diaz-Leon’s view strives to illustrate the evolution of the view from Saul, while remaining faithful to Diaz-
Leon’s suggested changes.  
12 See Kapusta (2016) and Wodak and Dembroff (2018). 
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markers of female sex. Thus, Diaz-Leon’s view predicts that Ash is using ‘woman’ as a 
gender term in Case 3.  
Diaz-Leon’s insight is that cases like Ash’s don’t reveal a problem for the kind of 
contextualist view that Saul proposes, per se. Rather, such cases bring out that the problem 
lies in those features determining the “standards at work” in context, i.e. the theory of salience 
baked into Saul’s contextualism. Before evaluating Diaz-Leon’s contextualism more 
closely, I am first going to head off a tempting objection to Diaz-Leon’s account of Case 3 
that will clarify an important feature of the view.  
Again, Diaz-Leon’s innovation is the claim that normative considerations play a role 
in determining the standards that are salient in context. This is what allows Diaz-Leon’s 
view to predict that because self-identification matters morally, Ash is using ‘woman’ as a 
gender term. On important, broadly Humean traditions in moral philosophy, however, 
that which matters morally depends on our attitudes, like our desires. On such views, it 
could be that the desires of traditionalists, including their (say) desire to maintain 
mainstream linguistic practice, play a role in determining that which matters in Case 3. If 
so, then having female sex characteristics could matter most in that context. On this line 
of thought, Diaz-Leon’s view predicts that Ash uses ‘woman’ as a gender term only on the 
assumption that what matters doesn’t depend on attitudes. But Diaz-Leon is in no position 
to make such an assumption. Or so one might object.  
Grant that what matters morally depends in some way on our desire-like attitudes. On 
this supposition, having female-sex characteristics matters, because traditionalists desire to 
maintain the mainstream linguistic practice of using ‘woman’ to talk about female sex 
characteristics. On this supposition, too, self-identification also matters, because Ash (say) 
desires not to be misgendered.  
However, it doesn’t follow that self-identification matters more than having female sex 
characteristics. Nor does it follow that having female sex characteristics matters more than 
self-identification. For it to follow that self-identification matters more than having female 
sex characteristics, the desire to avoid being misgendered has to carry more moral weight. 
For it to follow that having female sex characteristics matters more than self-identification, 
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the desire to maintain mainstream linguistic practice has to carry more moral weight. The 
claim that what matters morally depends on our desires entails neither of these further 
claims on its own. Thus, the question of whether morality depends on our desires is 
orthogonal to the question of which standard matters most in Case 3.13 Diaz-Leon need 
not worry about the tempting objection. 
Nevertheless, the tempting objection does make clear that another assumption is at play 
in this debate. Namely, Diaz-Leon must assume that some features, e.g. self-identification, 
carry some moral weight, at least enough to outweigh whatever weight there might be in 
having female-sex characteristics some of the time. After all, that’s how Diaz-Leon’s view 
predicts that Ash uses ‘woman’ as a gender term in Case 3. In the next section, however, 
I’ll argue that this assumption makes it difficult for Diaz-Leon to handle other kinds of 
cases and hence difficult to satisfy the usage constraint compellingly.  
 
3 Problems with Diaz-Leon’s Contextualism  
In the previous section, I illustrated how Saul’s contextualism accommodates the usage 
constraint. But I also illustrated how the view struggles to predict that, in Case 3, Ash is 
using ‘woman’ as a gender term. I then discussed how Diaz-Leon’s contextualism appears 
to improve Saul’s, by accommodating the usage constraint and predicting that Ash is using 
‘woman’ as a gender term in Case 3.  
Recall, however, that part of what motivates Saul to examine contextualism about 
‘woman’ in the first place is its promise in accommodating cases in which speakers use 
‘woman’ as a gender term and other cases in which speakers use it as a sex term. Diaz-Leon 
never circles back to discuss the latter. The main lesson of this section will be that Diaz-
Leon’s view has difficulty accounting for such cases. While Diaz-Leon’s has the benefit of 
making the right prediction about Ash, it has the cost of failing to satisfy the usage 
constraint. Or so I’ll now argue. Consider another example. 
 
13 See Schroeder (2007) 
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Case 4  Jo, who has XY chromosomes, penial genitalia, and the like, utters 
‘I’m a woman’ while visiting a friend at a rape crisis center offering 
counseling to victims of rape, the overwhelming majority of whom 
at the center are female.  
Mainstream usage of ‘woman’ suggests that speakers use it as a sex term in some 
scenarios. Case 4 is put forward as such a scenario – Jo is using ‘woman’ as a sex term. 
Suppose, however, that Jo is so fed up with being misgendered that they would become 
severely depressed and hence suicidal if ‘woman’ were not being used as a gender term.14 
Plausibly, self-identification would then carry the most moral weight. After all, Jo’s life in 
part depends on it. Because features that carry moral weight determine which standards are 
salient in context on Diaz-Leon’s view, and because self-identification is a non-biological 
feature, Diaz-Leon’s view predicts that a non-biological standard is salient in Case 4. Thus, 
Diaz-Leon’s view predicts that Jo is using ‘woman’ as a gender term, not a sex term. That’s 
a problem.  
This might strike readers as too quick, leaving them with the impression that something 
must be awry in Case 4. But Case 4 is no one-off counterexample. It is the result of a simple 
and repeatable recipe. Take any case in which ‘woman’ is being used plausibly as a sex term. 
Arrange the (consequentialist or non-consequentialist) features such that self-
identification matters. Further arrange the features such that self-identification matters 
more than any biological feature. The result will be that a non-biological standard is salient. 
Thus, speakers will use ‘woman’ as a gender term.15 Repeat these three steps.  
 
14 By using details involving a rape crisis center and depression-induced suicide in a philosophical example, I 
risk implicating that I do not take these matters seriously. Allow me to cancel that possible implicature. 
Sexual violence, depression, and suicide are all issues that hit close to home. I take these morally significant 
issues deeply seriously. 
15 It’s true that I am relying on the controversial idea (See Dowell 2016) that we can learn anything significant 
about the nature of our words by theorizing about the use of the graphemes that partially constitute them in 
various counterfactual scenarios. But this is a problem for everyone, since all the parties to this dispute employ 
the same sort of cases. 
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Getting around this problem requires that self-identification carries enough moral 
weight to make a non-biological standard salient in cases like Case 3, but not so much 
moral weight as to make such a standard salient in cases like Case 4. That’s too fine a line 
to walk. The point here is that, on Diaz-Leon’s view, ‘woman’ is used as a gender term in 
more cases than is compatible with the usage constraint.16 
In light of this line of criticism, it is natural to wonder whether Diaz-Leon’s view is a 
genuine form of contextualism rather than a form of invariantism in disguise, in which no 
part of the term shifts across contexts. Consider paradigmatically contextual terms like ‘I’ 
or ‘me’. We use these terms to talk about different speakers in different contexts. In fact, 
every context with a different speaker yields a different topic. Compare the number of 
contexts with different speakers to the number of contexts in which self-identification is 
not very morally significant. It’s no contest. But just as we would begin to doubt whether 
‘I’ or ‘me’ are contextual if we only ever used them to talk about anyone besides me, the 
author, we should doubt that ‘woman’ is contextual on Diaz-Leon’s view for similar 
reasons. 
In reply, Diaz-Leon could insist that ‘woman’ is more analogous to terms like ‘I’ than 
it seems on a first pass. Sure, Diaz-Leon might say, because the world is such that self-
identification matters morally, ‘woman’ is used as a gender term in a surprising number of 
cases. And sure, Diaz-Leon might also say, the world is such that ‘I’ is used in a huge 
variety of ways, e.g. as a Jennifer-Saul-term, Esa-Diaz-Leon-term, Angela-Merkel-term, 
Serena-Williams-term and so on. But, Diaz-Leon might then say, the source of this 
difference between ‘woman’ and ‘I’ is the nature of our world, not the nature of these words. 
In principle, the world could be such that we use ‘woman’ to talk about a huge variety of 
different standards in different contexts, perhaps equally as many standards as there are 
 
16 Over the course of developing my objection, I came to learn that Bettcher (2017) raises a similar worry 
with Diaz-Leon’s view. But Bettcher does so in the context of a survey article, and hence only has the space 
therein to gesture toward the problem. My presentation can be thought of as expanding on Bettcher’s 
compressed insight.  
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speakers occupying contexts. In other words, ‘woman’ and ‘I’ differ only superficially. Or 
so Diaz-Leon might say. 
Grant the point that ‘woman’ and ‘I’ owe their differences to worldly features that can 
be ignored. Still, on Diaz-Leon’s view, there is a real difference between the nature of 
‘woman’ and ‘I’, owing to the role that normative considerations play in uses of the former. 
Normative principles are widely held to be metaphysical necessary if true, e.g. necessarily 
there’s an obligation to treat persons with respect if there’s an obligation to treat persons 
with respect at all. If that’s right, then there will be a number of worlds that are such that 
e.g. misgendering amounts to a form of disrespect, and hence a number of worlds in which 
there’s an obligation not to misgender. In other words, there will be a number of worlds in 
which non-biological standards are salient, where ‘woman’ is used as a gender term. But 
then it seems like ‘woman’ is far less flexible than ‘I’. Thus, even granting the imagined 
response from Diaz-Leon, ‘woman’ seems different on their view from paradigmatically 
contextualist terms like ‘I’.  
There is another response to these concerns with Diaz-Leon’s view. It’s no problem, 
one might claim, that Jo is using ‘woman’ as a gender term in Case 4. Yes, typical cases 
involving medical scenarios or rape crisis centers are ones in which biological features carry 
the most moral weight. But Case 4 isn’t typical – it’s a case where non-biological features 
carry the most moral weight, in virtue of the fact that Jo would become strongly upset upon 
being misgendered. Accordingly, one might think, there’s no problem with making an 
exception for Case 4.17  
On one way of understanding this response, it’s calling into question the data that 
constitutes the usage constraint. Because any adequate characterization of ‘woman’ must 
accommodate the usage patterns of the term, such patterns place constraints on an adequate 
characterization of ‘woman’. The pattern at issue in this paper is that speakers sometimes 
use ‘woman’ as a sex term and sometimes use it as a gender term. Case 4 is put forward as 
 
17 In correspondence, Diaz-Leon offers a reply in this spirit.  
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an illustration of cases of the former type. The response above call this into question – it 
denies that Case 4 is one in which the speaker uses ‘woman’ as a sex term. 
Keep in mind, however, that Case 4 is supposed to be illustrative. Even if it turns out 
to be a case in which the speaker is using ‘woman’ as a gender term, there will still be other, 
similar cases in which speakers are using ‘woman’ as a sex term where the non-biological 
features are such that Diaz-Leon’s view predicts otherwise. Remember, Case 4 follows a 
simple and repeatable recipe. One could go through every such case, arguing that each of 
them are actually cases in which speakers are using ‘woman’ as a gender term. But doing so 
would seem to amount to a flat-out rejection of the usage constraint, and the start of an 
entirely different debate.  
In a last-ditch effort, one might grant these worries but insist that they’re not problems, 
because Diaz-Leo’s view is put forward as a revisionary one. While it’s true that Diaz-
Leon’s contextualism makes predictions that are at odds with the usage constraint, one 
might say, it’s also true that speakers should put in some effort to use ‘woman’ in the way 
the view predicts we’ve been using it from here on.  
Three comments: Firstly, Saul entertains the idea that we should consider 
contextualism as a revisionary proposal. (Saul 2012: 402). In response, Diaz-Leon is 
explicit about the nature of the project:  
“In response, I want to argue that we can see this point [Saul’s claim that 
“disagreements over who counts as a woman are simply not to be settled by 
appeal to the facts of language”] also as a genuinely linguistic point, that is, 
as a descriptive claim about the (actual) meaning of woman, not just as a 
revisionary proposal about how the term woman should be used, given our 
moral and political aims…I want to argue that it is also possible to provide 
moral and political considerations that are relevant with regard to the 
descriptive project of finding out the meaning of woman.” (Diaz-Leon 2016: 
248-249, emphasis mine) 
Of course, however, while Diaz-Leon might not conceive of their project as revisionary, 
it nevertheless could be that it’s best conceived of as such. This brings us to the second 
response, which is more concessive. Yes, it very well could be that the prospects for 
contextualism are best when seen through the revisionary lens. This point is exactly right, 
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and it’s one to which I’ll return toward the end of this paper. However, and this is the third 
response, it’s also worth noting that contextualism doesn’t, on the face of it, sit well with 
the revisionary goal of changing how ‘woman’ is used. For one of the central insights of 
contextualism is that speakers have less of a say, as it were, in how words are used, in virtue 
of the fact that context does a lot of the heavy lifting.18  
 
4 Toward an Alternative Account 
Recall, I set out to determine whether contextualist views of ‘woman’ can satisfy the usage 
and communicative constraints. So far, however, I have said very little about the latter. This 
is in a way unsurprising. For one of the main selling points of contextualist views, generally 
speaking, is that they associate a single component with words across contexts, making the 
communicative constraint satisfiable rather straightforwardly. As such, the question taking 
center stage has not been whether contextualist views like Saul’s and Diaz-Leon’s can 
satisfy the communicative constraint. Rather, the question has been whether they can 
satisfy the usage constraint. In the space remaining, I explore the following idea: starting 
with views that have an easy time with the communicative constraint, like contextualism, 
might end up occluding a promising route to satisfying both constraints. Perhaps if we start 
with views that seem to have an easier time with the usage constraint, we’ll then end up 
with a view that satisfies both constraints.  
From this perspective, the obvious alternative is the view that ‘woman’ is ambiguous – 
it has a sex-involving meaning or a gender-involving meaning, not a single meaning that 
determines different semantic values in different contexts. On such a view, speakers 
 
18 Another reply that Diaz-Leon suggests in correspondence distinguishes between normative considerations 
that are of the right kind to fix which standards are salient and those that aren’t. Diaz-Leon could then claim 
of Case 4 that while Jo’s risk of suicide from misgendering is a serious moral concern, it’s the wrong kind of 
moral concern to affect which standard is salient in context. It’s a normative consideration that can be 
screened off in the theory of contextual salience.  
But it seems that such a response makes Diaz-Leon’s view hostage to a solution to an even harder 
question – the question of how to distinguish reasons of the right and wrong kind. In other words, the 
problem with this response is that it involves jumping from the pan to the fire. See D’Arms & Jacobson 
(2000) and Rabinowicz & Rønnow-Rasmussen (2004) to get a sense of the difficulty of the issue.  
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sometimes use ‘woman’ to communicate the sex-involving meaning but sometimes use it 
to communicate the gender-involving meaning. This view makes the usage constraint a 
piece of cake.  
But it also faces an awkward difficulty: the communicative constraint tends to motivate 
philosophers to minimize ambiguities whenever possible. Take a word like ‘good’ from 
ethics, for example. Rarely in everyday use, it seems, do speakers have any trouble 
understanding what people mean with this term. This would be hard to square if ‘good’ 
were ambiguous, however. So, ethicists tend to conclude that ‘good’ and other ethically 
significant terms like it are not ambiguous.19   
Recently, however, the idea that there are different kinds of ambiguities, some better 
than others with respect to preserving the appearance that speakers succeed often in 
communicating with one another, has been garnering attention in philosophy.20 A term 
that is ambiguous has multiple meanings. That much is familiar. Less familiarly, a term 
can be ambiguous in the sense that it is homonymous, having multiple unrelated meanings, 
or it can be ambiguous in the sense that it is polysemous, having multiple related meanings.  
Standard examples of terms that are homonymous include ‘bank’. This term has one 
meaning involving financial institutions and another involving rivers. Compare the 
homonymous ambiguity of ‘bank’ to the polysemous ambiguity of ‘cut’. The term ‘cut’ has 
a meaning involving incision, another involving turning sharply, passing objectionably in a 
que, insulting someone, and so on. The principle difference between ‘bank’ and ‘cut’ is that 
the meanings of the former appear completely unrelated to one another, while the 
meanings of the latter all seem to have something to do with the idea of division. Such 
relations appear to preserve our ability to communicate successfully – it’s perhaps rarer to 
ask for clarification when an interlocutor uses a word like ‘cut’ than it is when they use a 
word like ‘bank’. The point is that there need not be reasons to avoid an ambiguity approach 
 
19 See especially Finlay (2014). Ziff (1960) and Thomson (1992), among others, also counsel caution before 
claiming that ‘good’ is ambiguous. 
20 Polysemy receives plenty of attention in linguistics. See Vicente & Falkum (2017) for an overview. 
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to characterizing a term, and so there need not be reasons to avoid an ambiguity approach 
to ‘woman’.21  
Of course, however, that there might not be any communicative constraint-based 
reasons against embracing polysemous ambiguity for ‘woman’ doesn’t imply that there are 
any reasons favoring one. But it’s not hard to find such reasons. For example, there is little 
controversy surrounding the etymology of ‘woman’. Many would agree that large groups of 
speakers have only recently begun using it clearly as a gender term.  This seems to imply 
that its recent meaning descends historically from an original one, which is interesting, 
because historical connectedness is one of the hallmarks of polysemy.22 Perhaps even more 
interestingly, a polysemous ambiguity account of ‘woman’ appears to have an important 
advantage over versions of contextualism like Diaz-Leon’s. Over the course of defending 
contextualism, Diaz-Leon issues the following criticism of Bettcher (2013), who holds a 
related view23 to the one I am floating: 
“…if we adopt a multiple-meaning account [or, relatedly, a polysemy 
account], we are accepting the existence of certain meanings that are 
exclusionary. That is, we will understand some speakers in some contexts as 
using woman in a way that is exclusionary…And this will have the 
consequence that whether (some) trans women count as women in some 
contexts will depend on which meanings are at issue…And this seems 
problematic.” (Diaz-Leon 2016: 254, original emphasis) 
It’s true that there will be some meanings of ‘woman’ that are exclusionary on the view 
that the term is polysemous. However, and this is key, that’s exactly what should be 
expected on a realistic portrayal of the current socio-political state of the world. It’s hard to 
 
21 Leslie (2015) suggests a similar view explicitly, arguing in the context of the debate regarding generics that 
it’s the best way to make sense of them.  
22 See Viebahn & Vetter (2016) 
23 Bettcher (2013: 240-244) argues that ‘woman’ has both “dominant” and “resistant” meanings, which map, 
roughly, onto the polysemous view of ‘woman’ floated in this paper, where ‘woman’ has a meaning in 
mainstream society that is different from the meaning it has among trans and trans-inclusive feminist 
communities. This is why the views are similar. Though similar, I hesitate to characterize Bettcher’s view as 
polysemic not only because Bettcher doesn’t, but also because some of what Bettcher says suggests that 
speakers can “reject” as “false” attributions of terms with meanings for which they are against, implying that 
speakers have a degree of linguistic control that is in tension with my understanding of polysemic views. 
Comparing these views fully requires more space than is available in this paper.  
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deny that mainstream usage of ‘woman’ often excludes trans individuals. That’s part of the 
reason there even exists trans-inclusive feminist activism. It’s precisely because so many 
speakers in the world use the excluding senses of ‘woman’ that trans-inclusive feminist 
activism has teeth. Trans-inclusive feminist activism would make little sense if everyone 
were already using ‘woman’ in a trans-inclusive way.  
This way of understanding the significance of trans-inclusive feminist activism might 
seem to imply that philosophers should think about cases like Case 3 differently, where 
Ash uses ‘woman’ as a sex term in part because they are surrounded by traditionalists. 
Indeed, it does have this implication. Saul worries that in cases like Ash’s, the contextualist 
view they explore is morally problematic because it predicts that Ash is using ‘woman’ as a 
gender term. Partially as a result, Saul abandons the view. Diaz-Leon shares the worry, 
setting out to resolve it semantically, by developing a normative version of contextualism 
predicting that Ash is using ‘woman’ as a gender term. Saul and Diaz-Leon are right to 
worry that their views predict that Ash is using ‘woman’ as a sex term, but wrong to think 
that the remedy is to find a semantic view that doesn’t have this prediction. That’s a way 
of denying that Ash’s situation was really ever problematic, and hence a way of saying that 
there wasn’t to begin with any trans-inclusive feminist work to be done in such situations. 
But there was and is such work – it’s just more moral or political than semantic.  
On a polysemic picture, one of the goals of trans-inclusive feminist activism is to agitate 
for broader use of the more inclusive senses of ‘woman’ available. To touch an earlier point, 
the resulting picture is a revisionary or engineering one in a particular sense. The goal isn’t 
to engineer a concept or word in the sense of introducing a new one. That’s already 
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happened, as use of it among trans and trans-inclusive feminist communities indicate.24 
Instead, at least from the perspective of trans-inclusive feminist activism, the goal is to 
make the inclusive use of ‘woman’ more mainstream.25 
It might be said in response that the polysemy view doesn’t have the advantage of 
making better sense of trans-inclusive feminist activism than Diaz-Leon’s contextualism. 
Suppose Diaz-Leon were to supplement their brand of contextualism with resources 
broadly available to semantic externalists, on which words, roughly, mean what they do in 
virtue of referring to what they do, and they refer to what they do in virtue of being causally 
connected via chains of use to baptismal events introducing them or in virtue of being 
connected deferentially to use among communities of experts. Details aside, the upshot 
could be that mainstream use of ‘woman’ is maximally inclusive but speakers aren’t aware 
of it.26 If so, then it could be that one of the organizing goals of trans-inclusive feminist 
activism is to make everyone aware that they’re using the word ‘woman’ inclusively already. 
Perhaps that’s the best way to understand the significance of trans-inclusive feminist 
activism, instead.  
 
24 In a recent paper, Bogardus (forthcoming: 23) argues, among other things, that attempts to provide a trans-
inclusive account of ‘woman’ that depend on the possibility of conceptual engineering are either “impossible 
to complete due to unintelligibility” or “impossible to complete, at least in a way that includes all or even 
most trans women”. There isn’t enough space to investigate Bogardus’ argument fully. But focus on the first 
disjunct. Note, trans individuals and trans-inclusive feminists engaging in conceptual engineering (such as 
Jenkins (2016, 2018), who employs Haslanger’s (2000) “Ameliorative Inquiry” version of it, which Bogardus 
singles out) use ‘woman’ in an inclusive sense. Note, too, that when they do, they understand each other. 
This simple fact counts strongly against any argument for the “unintelligibility” of trans-inclusive uses of 
‘woman’ that have been engineered as such. In particular, it suggests that Bogardus’ argument by elimination 
for this claim fails (perhaps because, like arguments by elimination generally, it doesn’t eliminate every view).  
Moreover, Bogardus takes his argument to show that the first disjunct is true because “Ameliorative 
Inquiry inevitably introduces ambiguity—new homonyms—and thereby results in merely verbal disputes, a 
change of subject” (my emphasis). Bogardus doesn’t acknowledge the possibility of polysemy. With polysemy 
in view, it looks possible to engage in at least something close to ameliorative inquiry in Haslanger’s sense 
without “introducing [homonymous] ambiguity”. 
25 Dembroff (forthcoming) arrives at conclusions in the same spirit from a different starting point.  
26 See Kripke (1972) and Putnam (1975) for canonical treatments. See Mallon (2017) for a recent discussion 
of externalist views of social terms, errors in use, and other related issues.  
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This response raises a number of interesting issues that there isn’t space to explore fully. 
Nevertheless, there are at least two reasons – one specific to the debate and one more 
general – to think it doesn’t succeed in showing that Diaz-Leon’s view of ‘woman’ makes 
better sense of trans-inclusive feminist activism surrounding it than a polysemous view. 
Suppose speakers are using ‘woman’ in a maximally inclusive way on a version of Diaz-
Leon’s view that is supplemented with externalist resources. If so, and this is the first 
specific reason, then it’s hard to see why Saul and Diaz-Leon would ever have been worried 
about Ash’s use of ‘woman’ in cases like Case 3. But even if they’re mistaken to worry, as 
I’ve suggested above, it’s not hard to see why they’re worried.  
Moreover, and this is the second more general reason, the English language is shot 
through with words that are polysemic.27 Though the issue is seriously underexplored, the 
fact that the English language, and most languages, for that matter, contain so many 
polysemic words seems to be in serious tension with strong forms of semantic externalism. 
Combining strong forms of semantic externalism with the fact that the English language 
contains wildly many polysemic words seems to suggest an implausible degree to which 
English speakers are ignorant or in error.  
 
5 Conclusions 
One of my main aims in this paper has been to show that Diaz-Leon’s version of 
contextualism predicts that we use ‘woman’ much more often as a gender term than as a sex 
term, in a way that is starkly at odds with the usage constraint. Along the way, I also put 
forward the claim that we should be open to ambiguity-based alternatives to contextualism, 
like a polysemy account of ‘woman’. Admittedly, it’s easy to walk away from these claims 
with the impression that the central upshot of this paper is that the whole family of 
contextualist views about ‘woman’ is hopeless.  
 
27 As Fogal (2016) points out, “…polysemy is utterly pervasive in natural language…and it affects both 
content and function words. It also tends to be both systematic and productive, with similar patterns of 
polysemy applying to similar words across many languages…the default hypothesis for pretty much any 
ordinary noun, adjective, or verb should be that it is polysemous, and thoroughly so.” 
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But that’s not quite right. As it happens, the jury is still very much out on how to 
understand the precise differences between contextualism and polysemy. Indeed, some 
philosophers argue that there isn’t much daylight between polysemy and contextualism.28 
It could be, then, that in defending a polysemic view of ‘woman’, I’ve defended a kind of 
contextualism. Moreover, I argued that attempts like Diaz-Leon’s to make facts about the 
contextualist semantics of ‘woman’ line up with facts about how we ought to treat each 
other morally, by building morality into semantics, come up short. But not all contextualist 
views build morality into semantics. The contextualist view that Saul floats doesn’t. So, I 
can also be read as defending non-normative versions of contextualism like Saul’s; at least, 
I can be read as offering such a defense, so long as what’s really going on in cases like Ash’s 
in Case 3 is appreciated – Ash’s context is such that ‘woman’ is being used as a sex term 
now, but trans-inclusive feminist activists are working to create a society in which that’s 
not the case later.  
Whether a non-normative contextualism or polysemy ambiguity theory for ‘woman’ is 
best, it’s worth emphasizing that such views are promising in part because they don’t 
incorporate moral conditions into semantics. Instead of tasking semanticists with sorting 
out how it could be that the semantic facts line up with the moral facts, we should ask 
moral philosophers, including, especially, trans-inclusive feminist moral philosophers, 
what we ought to do in light of these facts failing to line up. 
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